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An enabling framework for 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Europe: 
An overview of key issues 
Milan Elkerbout and Julie Bryhn 
here are few credible scenarios for reaching the EU’s long-term climate policy objectives, 
such as net-zero by 2050, without the large-scale deployment of CCS technology. Carbon 
capture and storage technology is a pre-requisite for the decarbonisation of energy-intensive 
industries, which in the EU are responsible for about a fifth of all greenhouse gas emissions. At the 
same time, carbon capture technologies have only been tested at smaller scales and are not yet 
available at scale for the multiple energy-intensive industries that need them. To prepare for larger-
scale CCS deployment in the period after 2030, steps should be taken today to address economic 
as well as political barriers, and thereby support development of key infrastructure and technology. 
In doing so, policy should focus on improving the investment case for both CCS as well as low-
carbon industrial products that carbon capture makes possible. This includes specific financing 
models that account for the high capital intensity of CCS, regional variation in industrial clusters, 
infrastructure and storage availability as well as the need to combine both private and public 
money. 
Recommendations: 
• Plans for CCS deployment should be developed in parallel with analysis on the expected 
demand for negative emissions, as well as how to deliver these negative emissions. 
Imperfect capture rates and bio-energy with CCS (BECCS) use will impact this demand. 
• Policy support should target the improvement of capture rates in major energy-intensive 
industries so that theoretical potentials can be demonstrated. 
• To support scale-up, initial focus should be on industrial clusters where various sources of 
CO2 can be combined into larger volumes. 
• EU state aid rules (e.g. environmental state aid guidelines) should facilitate member state 
spending to support CCS infrastructure development. 
• Political choices should be made as to the market and financing models that will apply to 
CCS development, both on the capital investment side as well as on the operational 
financing side. 
T 
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With the release of the European Commission’s long-term climate strategy, the question of 
how to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions is crucial for EU climate policy development. 
Carbon capture technology, as well as transport and storage infrastructure, is seen as 
indispensable to address emissions from energy-intensive industries that are otherwise hard to 
abate. Without carbon capture and storage (CCS), zero-carbon products in some industries (e.g. 
basic materials such as steel and cement) are not feasible.1 This makes CCS a transformational 
technology on the path towards a net-zero economy. As a result, the role of carbon capture 
features prominently in the long-term strategy, with potential reductions of 52 MtCO2 to 606 
MtCO2 depending on the different scenarios.2 The upper range represents about a third of total 
EU ETS emissions in 2018. 
CCS technology is similar to other low-carbon technologies in that government policy is a 
necessary part of market creation. Without policy, there will be no market. Without a market, 
there will be no investment case. CCS is one element of the general long-term climate policy 
challenge of creating a market for zero-carbon industrial products.3  
Nevertheless, CCS is not the only relevant technology for achieving deep decarbonisation in 
industry: electrification can also significantly contribute to decarbonisation of industry. In trying 
to electrify major industrial processes, however, low-carbon electricity demand could increase 
precipitously. The European Commission roadmap scenario, which maximises electrification, 
leads to a doubling if not tripling of EU electricity demand.4 Hydrogen can likewise be important 
as a feedstock in industry. The production of low-carbon hydrogen, however, either greatly 
increases electricity demand further (electrolysis) or requires methane reforming with carbon 
capture as well, thereby reinforcing the case for CCS.  
Besides storing CO2, utilising it (i.e. Carbon Capture and Use - CCU) is also an option. The most 
important constraint is the limited demand for processes where CO2 is used, while not being 
released into the atmosphere at a later stage.5 Without such permanence, CCU is not a good 
alternative to CCS but rather a means to incrementally reduce emissions and create an 
additional revenue stream for CCS projects. Additionally, the process of transforming CO2 into 
 
1 See also: Wyns et al, (2019). Industrial Transformation 2050 Towards an Industrial Strategy for a Climate Neutral 
Europe, IES VUB. 
2 See European Commission (2018), “In-Depth Analysis In Support Of The Commission Communication 
COM(2018) 773”, p. 198. 
3 This can include contracts for differences, public procurement standards etc. See Elkerbout, M. and Egenhofer, 
C, (2018), Tools to boost investment in low-carbon technologies, CEPS Policy Insight, (http://ceps-
ech.eu/publication/tools-boost-investment-low-carbon-technologies) where the issue is further explored. 
4 The EC roadmap scenario, which maximises electrification, leads to an increase in EU electricity demand from 
22% in 2015 to 58% of final demand in 2050. See European Commission (2018), In-depth analysis in support of 
the Commission Communication COM(2018) 773: A Clean Planet for all. A European long-term strategic vision 
for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate neutral economy, p. 72. 
5 CCU is discussed more in detail in the CEPS Policy Insight “Sinking to Zero: the role of carbon capture and 
negative emissions in EU climate policy” by Milan Elkerbout and Julie Bryhn; January 2019. 
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an input or product that can be utilised elsewhere is energy-intensive. This comes on top of the 
capture stage which is already inherently energy-intensive. 
Ready to go? The technological readiness and deployment of CCS  
As of summer 2019, there are four particularly promising projects that could push CCS further: 
the Porthos Project in the Port of Rotterdam which targets a major industrial cluster; the 
Northern Lights project in Norway, which aims to be an open-access hub where companies can 
deliver captured CO2 for storage; the Acorn project in Scotland, which promulgates close public-
private cooperation, and the Teesside region, where process industry and a gas power plant 
are jointly working on CCS infrastructure. After 2030, the lessons from such projects should 
facilitate further deployment of CCS at scale, thereby making industrial decarbonisation and 
net-zero climate targets more feasible. 
The attraction of carbon capture is partly based on the assumption that it can address emissions 
that are otherwise hard to avoid, particularly in energy-intensive industries. This presumes high 
capture rates for the capture technology applied to industrial processes. The viability of CCS to 
deliver net-zero depends on capture rates being sufficiently high, i.e. up to 90%. In principle, 
there are no technological reasons why they cannot reach close to 100%, but a capture rate in 
excess of 90% significantly escalates costs. For some industrial processes, however, experience 
with capture has been insufficient so far as to establish even 90% capture rates. In the absence 
of sufficiently high capture rates, CCS usage will increase the demand for negative emissions 
technology. To manage this, it could be desirable to consider limits for CO2 capture from 
processes where capture rates are not sufficiently high so that the impact on negative 
emissions demand can be managed. 
As the costs of capture represent about two thirds of the total costs of CCS according to some 
industrial stakeholders, further improvements in capture technology could be a major 
contributor to increasing the cost competitiveness of CCS. This points towards the need for 
continued investment in R&D (e.g. through the EU’s Horizon Europe programme) for capture 
technology, in addition to later stage innovation and infrastructure investments.  
Ideally, initial CCS projects will be focused on industrial clusters where the supply and 
concentration of CO2 to be captured is sufficiently high. In these cases, an infrastructure of 
pipelines would be the most efficient way of transporting CO2 in large quantities. As many CCS 
projects will likely receive initial public support, such pipelines will likely be open to all operators 
wishing to store captured CO2. Such open-access infrastructure can help with scaling up use of 
CCS, thereby lowering costs.  
In other cases, installations seeking to capture CO2 will not have pipelines at their disposal. 
Transportation via inland waterways or trucks is then an alternative. This may increase 
operational costs, but on the other hand may be less risky investments, as there are no lock-in 
effects associated with the infrastructure. Transportation via ships or trucks could also work for 
installations only wanting to capture smaller volumes and can be scaled up more rapidly than 
fixed networks that may require permits.   
4 | ELKERBOUT & BRYHN 
 
Land-based CO2 storage may be less suitable for permanent storage due to the difficulty of 
ensuring safe storage. There is a minor risk6 of earth tremors when storing CO2 on land, as well 
as the hazard of ground water acidification should any CO2 escape. More generally, storage on 
land risks public opprobrium in countries where there is public scepticism towards CO2 storage. 
For temporary storage, however, as part of a larger carbon capture supply chain, storage on 
land could be an option. Assessing the continued integrity of storage sites to ensure 
permanence requires continuous monitoring and expenditure and therefore raises operational 
costs. 
Financing the future: the investment case for CCS 
The upfront capital investments required in capture, transport and storage infrastructure 
prompt the question of the relative shares of private and public finance.  
Given that CCS would be implemented mostly7 for sectors covered by the EU emissions trading 
system (ETS), the first question is what the contribution of a carbon price signal can be. Up to 
now, even following the higher carbon prices seen in the wake of the reforms completed 
between 2015 and 2018, the ETS price of around €25 is well below the price needed to make 
the investment case for CCS. Even if the ETS price continues to rise, investment in CCS 
infrastructure is needed in the short-term if emissions are to be captured at scale in the 
medium and long-term. Instead, a higher carbon price will rather support investment cases in 
CCS by making continued investment in and operation of more carbon-intensive assets less 
attractive. The carbon price will have a greater impact in later stages of technology deployment 
once costs come down thanks to process improvements and scale. 
Much like limiting the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere which CCS 
contributes to, CCS infrastructure itself could also be construed as a public good.8 Being a public 
good, however, implies that there would be underinvestment due to free-riding concerns, i.e. 
all companies wanting to capture emissions would benefit from already existing CCS 
infrastructure. This creates an additional rationale for public intervention.  
CCS is not extraordinarily expensive compared to other low-carbon technologies that have 
received public support. The implicit carbon price associated with renewables support9 has in 
some cases been well over €100 per tonne.  
 
6 See also: https://www.chalmers.se/en/areas-of-advance/energy/Documents/Chalmers%20Energy% 
20Conference%202011/argumenten%20kaart%20CCS%20engels.pdf 
7 The waste treatment sector is an exception. 
8 A public good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. I.e. the use of CCS infrastructure by one part would not 
impede another party doing so as well. In principle, infrastructure can be exclusive, but it can also be set up in 
such a way that other parties can have equal access, as is common with public infrastructure. 
9 E.g. the case of solar support in Germany under the EEG. See also: 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/30200/RSCAS_2014_28_REV.pdf?sequence=3 
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Where should funding come from? 
One instrument created with the express purpose of supporting, inter alia, CCS in industry, is 
the EU ETS Innovation Fund. This fund will disburse money generated by the sale of some 
450 million allowances over the 10-year trading period of the ETS starting in 2021. At current 
carbon prices, this amounts to just over a billion euros a year in funding. However, it has been 
set up to fund more than just CCS, including other industrial decarbonisation and renewable 
energy projects. Another European instrument is the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), which 
targets infrastructure investment, and which has already supported CCS projects.  
While the transportation infrastructure of CCS could be funded this way, the storage of CO2 
itself is not eligible, thereby limiting the potential of the Connecting Europe Facility for CCS. 
Furthermore, the EIT Climate-KIC on sustainable finance could support the development of CCS 
at the European level through its capacity for demonstration, scaling of financing and de-
risking. This makes the instruments of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) of the 
EU budget especially pertinent. While they can provide important sources of funding for CCS, 
they are unlikely to cover all the funding needs. Funding will need to be provided by EU and 
EEA member states as well, some of which may contribute significant funds. Through the 
Northern Lights project, Norway is in fact one of the biggest proponents of advancing CCS. By 
promising storage availability, it aims to support the investment case. Beyond Europe, the US 
45Q tax credit10 is an example of a fiscal measure that supports CCS development while 
differentiating the support between different CCS applications. 
Whatever investments are made in CCS infrastructure, expectations for the long-term demand 
for CCS as well as negative emissions and bio-energy with CCS (BECCS)11 use should be 
considered. Significant use of bio-energy with CCS in the second half of the century to deliver 
negative emissions can further increase demand for storage sites. Particularly for early projects, 
the business case for operating CO2 transportation and storage infrastructure could be 
undermined if operators cannot acquire, and be remunerated, for sufficient amounts of 
captured CO2. 
CCS: not the most regulated space 
Up until now, CCS has not received much dedicated regulatory attention. This creates some 
uncertainty for market actors that often need to operate across multiple countries and with 
extended time horizons. The EU’s CCS Directive is without a provision for continuous review, 
and as such, may not necessarily be updated in time to reflect new realities, including the 
 
10 See https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:26%20section:45Q%20edition:prelim) 
11 With bio-energy and carbon capture and storage (BECCS), CO2 is first absorbed by trees or other biomass, 
thereby lowering the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. This biomass is subsequently combusted to produce 
energy, e.g. electricity or heat. The CO2 released upon combustion is then captured and stored, leading to ‘net-
negative emissions’. See also the CEPS Policy Insight “Sinking to Zero”, 22 Jan 2019, https://www.ceps.eu/ 
ceps-publications/sinking-zero-role-carbon-capture-and-negative-emissions-eu-climate-policy/ 
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required scale in light of net-zero GHG targets.12 Currently, for example, the definition of a 
transport network under the Directive only concerns CO2 transported through pipelines, as 
opposed to that transported by ships or trucks.  
The London Protocol [on marine pollution],13 which covers dumping of waste in the sea, 
restricts CO2 trade across borders. An amendment to this protocol, currently pending 
ratification,14 would allow for cross-border transport of CO2 between countries to develop, and 
thereby facilitate the creation of a European market for CCS. Nevertheless, willing states should 
not be hindered from engaging in bilateral agreements bypassing the limitations set out in the 
London Protocol. 
Clarity on issues such as the safety, monitoring and verification, liability, permits, intellectual 
property rights, trade of CO2 and infrastructure between countries, and accounting for CO2 
capture and use is a precondition for the investment case. Various pieces of EU legislation 
already apply, including directives on environmental liability and industrial emissions. However, 
given the cross-border impacts, consistent transposition at member state level is important, as 
are domestic regulations in case the EU has not acted. 
What type of market? 
The positioning of competition authorities will influence the investment landscape for CCS 
infrastructure. With dense infrastructure requirements and network externalities, CCS 
infrastructure may be a natural monopoly. This requires adequate regulation.  
The issue of monopoly is also relevant from the perspective of countries wanting to make use 
of storage infrastructure in other countries. The market power accruing to monopolistic CO2 
storage (or transportation) operators may be a deterrent for those parties considering long-
term commitments to capturing CO2. This compounds the need for multiple regions to develop 
CCS infrastructure, ideally with different models, such as pipelines and open-access 
transportation through ships (or trucks). 
The choice between two common models of private participation in public infrastructure 
financing is relevant for CCS infrastructure. These models are the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) 
model and project financing through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP).15 A benefit of the RAB 
model is that it is able to accommodate changes in policy more easily, which may be desirable 
given the complexity of long-term climate governance. A downside is that the RAB model tends 
to lead to excessive capital expenditure. This capital bias is the result of regulated party 
preferring capital over operational expenditure, as the former earns a rate of return. The PPP 
 
12 The Directive was reviewed in 2015, but the Directive does not contain a provision for continuous reviews. 
However, no future reviews are planned yet.  
13 See page of 10 of https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CCS_London_Protocol.pdf 
14 See e.g. https://hub.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/temp/ratify-or-not-ratify-2009-london-protocol-
amendment. 
15 See also the discussion in this OECD paper: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jrw13st0z37-
en.pdf?expires=1556204485&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=5702723216B6DAA3E1A8CD734E10B4C3 
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model scores better when it comes to timely and cost-effective delivery, which in the case of 
CCS is beneficial given the steep pathways to 2050 targets. It focuses more strongly on returns 
on capital, but this also makes the approach more complicated. Even if the PPP model is 
structured to boost competition, it may not always result in the financing of societally desirable 
projects, given concerns on the returns. The choice between these models should also be 
informed by the need to achieve cost reductions so that further economies of scale are 
facilitated. 
Open questions on financing and the business case 
Both companies wanting to capture CO2 emissions as well as those wanting to invest in 
transportation and storage of CO2 need each other equally. Without the necessary 
infrastructure being available, a company cannot go ahead with capture. At the same time, 
those providing transportation and storage infrastructure need to be ensured that there is 
enough supply of captured CO2. This points to a need for partnerships that can bring stability 
for investments and get projects up and running, including by limiting cross-chain risk, where 
failure of one element leads to risks to the larger CCS value chain.16  
Policy support may need to differentiate between capital investments and operational 
expenditure. At every stage of the CCS value chain, whether in capture, transport or storage, 
significant capital expenditure will be required to fit installations and build infrastructure. It may 
be necessary in some cases to provide public support for operational expenditures, such as 
ongoing energy use when capturing CO2 or when transporting it. This would have implications 
from a state aid perspective, as operational state aid is subject to more stringent conditions in 
order to be compatible with the internal market. Currently, environmental state aid guidelines 
do allow for operating aid for the promotion of renewables.17 Nevertheless, the choice of what 
products or technologies to promote remains a political one. 
If operational financing is provided this could take the form of a given amount of funding per 
tonne of CO2 stored. The EU ETS price will be an important point of reference here. For every 
tonne of CO2 that is no longer emitted due to the use of carbon capture technology, an operator 
no longer needs to surrender an allowance for those emissions. If the subsidy provided exceeds 
the carbon price, the question arises of what happens to this ‘upside’, i.e. whether there should 
be conditionality on how this additional money is spent.  
On the side of capture, investments will also be relatively capital-intensive to adapt industrial 
processes in such a way as to enable the capture of CO2 that is sufficiently clean and 
concentrated.  
 
16 See also p. 17 of the report to the thirty second meeting of the european gas regulatory forum 5-6 june 2019: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/iogp_-_report_-_ccs_ccu.pdf 
17 The Commission Regulation EU 2017/1084 revising the General Block Exemption Regulation makes further 
reference to instances where operational aid is deemed compatible with the internal market. See also the Annex 
containing these instances, including for renewables support 
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Equally important as what type of funding is provided is the question of who will provide the 
financing in practice. For earlier stages (which should focus on replicability), mixed financing of 
both public and private sources will be more important, with more market-based mechanisms 
being suitable for later stages. In the case of public financing, the idea of green bonds being 
issued by a public operator of CO2 infrastructure has been proposed in the context of the Acorn 
project.18 The issue of who operates (and develops) CO2 infrastructure also raises the question 
of whether this could be done by a private entity, in light of the public good characteristics of 
CCS. Conversely, for private entities, in the absence of higher carbon prices, a business case 
may be lacking until carbon capture technologies are scaled up. With regard to the financial 
sector, their close involvement in projects in early stages in crucial, due to the long lead times 
(of 5 years or more). 
Outlook 
While carbon capture technology and CO2 transportation and storage infrastructure remains 
essential for deep decarbonisation in industry, barriers remain to its deployment at scale. For 
now, CCS technology and infrastructure has not reached levels of technological maturity that 
allow for capturing significant shares of industrial GHG emissions.  
However, policy needs to start addressing existing economic, regulatory and political barriers. 
These barriers are manageable, although they require close coordination between different 
industries and EU and EEA member states and in some cases, other countries.  
A complication is that capture on the one hand and transport, storage, or use on the other need 
to be developed in parallel: industry needs to capture emissions so that there can be something 
to store (or use). Countries need to commit to transportation and storage infrastructure so that 
companies can commit to capturing emissions, and vice versa. The parallel involvement of 
multiple member states and regions is also desirable from a competition point of view, and to 
gain experience with different models for developing CCS infrastructure. The example of the 
Porthos project in the Port of Rotterdam is a good example of an entire region and industrial 
cluster being involved in a CCS project, with potential pipelines to Germany further extending 
its scope. 
While some of the issues discussed here are specific to CCS, many are inherent to any capital-
intensive breakthrough low-carbon technology. Moreover, carbon capture – as a technological 
process – is ultimately a means to an end. The end is to allow for the production of low-carbon 
industrial products. CCS may not always be necessary for delivering such products. In some 
cases, material/product substitution can even reduce the demand for current carbon-intensive 
products. In many cases, carbon capture could however prove to be a good option to combine 
 
18 See also the discussion of this idea in a CEPS Commentary by Heleen de Coninck: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/ 
what-can-ipcc-special-report-global-warming-15°c-tell-us-about-ccs-and-ccu-agenda. 
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industrial production in sectors in which Europe has long been competitive with the demands 
of a net-zero climate strategy. 
Therefore, in supporting the market – specifically also on the demand-side19 – for these low-
carbon materials and industrial products more broadly, CCS can emerge and develop as one 
building block of such a market. One of the common challenges facing most industry sectors 
for which CCS is an option – and for whom low-carbon markets are still missing – is that of 
international competition. With the main barriers being economic, and the sectors for which 
CCS would be an option being trade-intensive, addressing the issue of embedded carbon traded 
in international goods is likewise important if CCS is to emerge at scale.20 
 
19 Cf http://ceps-ech.eu/publication/tools-boost-investment-low-carbon-technologies. 
20 See also the discussion in this SWP Research Paper by S. Droege et al (2018). https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/mobilising-trade-policy-for-climate-action-under-the-paris-agreement/. 
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